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 We are living in an age where use of multimedia technologies like digital 
recorders and mobile phones is increasing rapidly. On the other hand, digital 
content manipulating softwares are also increasing making it easy for an 
individual to doctor the recorded content with trivial consumption of time 
and wealth. Digital multimedia forensics is gaining utmost importance to 
restrict unethical use of such easily available tampering techniques. These 
days, it is common for people to record videos using their smart phones. We 
have also witnessed a sudden growth in the use of surveillance cameras, 
which we see inhabiting almost every public location. Videos recorded using 
these devices usually contains crucial evidence of some event occurence and 
thereby most susceptible to inter-frame forgery which can be easily 
performed by insertion/removal/replication of frame(s). The proposed 
forensic technique enabled detection of inter-frame forgery in H.264 and 
MPEG-2 encoded videos especially mobile recorded and surveillance videos. 
This novel method introduced objectivity for automatic detection and 
localization of tampering by utilizing prediction residual gradient and optical 
flow gradient. Experimental results showed that this technique can detect 
tampering, regardless of the video codec and recording device utilized and 
number of frames tampered. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 In this technology oriented world, digital video recorders especially surveillance cameras are 
commonly available at every place which generates massive amount of multimedia content. Moreover, 
technology enthusiasm among young generation has increased the usage of mobile phones causing increase 
in the availability of captured digital content [1]. Digital videos often provide significant forensic evidence in 
various medical, legal and surveillance applications which make such applications extremely dependant on 
the credibility of visual content portrayed in these videos. The substantial usage of digital videos in our day-
to-day lives has also led to an increase in the utilization of easy to use and inexpensive video editing software 
which enhance the visual contents of digital videos. However, an individual can easily utilize such content 
editing software to make unauthorized modifications, termed as forgery, to the digital content making it 
extremely difficult to place complete trust in the integrity of such digital content [2]. To make ethical 
utilization of recorded digital videos in crucial matters, it becomes essential to ascertain that the visual 
contents of a video under consideration have not undergone any post-production manipulation and are a 
reliable depiction of reality.   
  Although lot of techniques have been proposed in the literature to detect forgery in images [3], 
numerous video tampering detection techniques have also been proposed. These techniques fall into one of 
the two basic categories of forensic schemes: active schemes and passive schemes. Active forensic scheme 
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maintain the authenticity of digital media throughout the entirety of their usage by embedding watermark or 
digital signature in the video [4], [5]. But this pre-embedding generally degrades the quality of digital content 
and also requires special hardware for engrafting watermark or digital signature. To overcome this issue, the 
field of passive forensics was conceptualized. Passive forensic schemes analyze specific static and/or 
temporal artifacts which arise due to the meddling of tampering operations with the underlying characteristics 
of digital content. Such approaches are utilized to detect any unauthorized manipulation performed either at 
intra-frame level or at inter-frame level. Forgery performed at intra-frame level manipulates a frame at pixel 
level, object level [6], [7] or at entire frame level [8]. On the other hand, Inter-frame tampering can be 
performed by mere removal [9], insertion [10] and/or replication [11] of a frame or set of frames to/from a 
video.   
Video inter-frame forgery is very easy to perform but it is very difficult for a human eye to detect 
the presence of such forgeries without the help of any specialized technique. Surveillance and mobile 
recorded videos are easily generated and are very prone to such forgeries as one can easily counterfeit the 
absence or presence of certain objects in the footage by simply removing or inserting suitable frames from/to 
the respective footage. This reconstructed video is then used as a fallacious proof of evidence. With increase 
in the probability of such malicious operations, the techniques to detect these tampered videos also require 
significant improvements. 
Numerous approaches have been proposed in the literature to detect the presence of inter-frame 
forgery in the video sequence. Such forgeries are usually performed by first converting the video into a 
sequence of frames followed by deletion/insertion/replication of some frames and finally reencoding the 
video. As some amount of compression is inevitable whenever a video is saved, the reconstruction of a 
doctored video after manipulation always results in double compression. So, some of the authors in the 
literature utilized the analysis of double MPEG compression to ensure the existence of inter-frame forgery. 
The prominent technique in this context was proposed by Wang and Farid in [15] where the authors analyzed 
periodicity in DCT coefficients of I-frames and prediction error of P-frames. However, they did not provide 
any quantitative results. Some researchers examined Benford's law violation in quantized DCT coefficients 
by utilizing 36-D, 12-D and 63-D feature vector in [16-18] respectively. Double compression in MPEG-4 
encoded videos was firstly detected in [19] by utilizing Markov Statistics, which was dependent on 
quantization scale values of reconstructed video. Other techniques for double compression detection were 
proposed by authors in [20-22] based on Block Artifact Strength (BAS), Variation in Prediction Footprint 
(VPF) and their combination respectively.  
 The authors in [18], however, stated the fact that not every video that shows signs of recompression 
has been tampered with inter-frame forgery because double compression can occur after uploading, 
downloading or even transmitting a video. This fact induced the need to detect the presence of some other 
artifacts that could ensure the presence of inter-frame forgery. Frame insertion detection technique proposed 
in [10] utilized a feature called Block-wise Brightness Variance Descriptor (BBVD). Different frame removal 
detection techniques have been proposed in [9], [23], [12]. The technique proposed in [9] used multiple 
features which were based on prediction error energy and number of intra-coded macro-blocks, quantization 
scale and Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio values. Likewise, the authors in [23] and [12] utilized Enhanced 
Fluctuation Feature (EFF) and Sequence of Average Residual of P-frames (SARP) respectively for frame 
removal detection with sound accuracy. One of the frame removal detection technique proposed in [24] 
utilized the measure of brightness variance. Another type of frame based tampering named frame replication 
was detected by analyzing disturbance in the temporal correlation of all adjacent frame pairs [11]. Moreover, 
Motion Compensated Edge Artifact (MCEA) difference [25] and prediction residual error [14] between 
adjacent P-frames are significant clues to detect both frame insertion and removal of set of frames. Technique 
proposed in [26], [27] analyzed the autocorrelation of VPF pattern and utilized the measure of optical flow 
consistency among adjacent frames respectively. However, the author in [13] efficiently detected all kinds of 
frame tampering using optical flow consistency measure but validated on limited dataset of MPEG-2 encoded 
videos. Most of these techniques utilized subjective analysis of the artifacts left after tampering operation 
which requires human-computer interaction. Some of these techniques were affected by the number of 
frames tampered and bit-rates of the video. Moreover, most of the techniques were developed for forgery 
detection in MPEG-2 encoded video sequences but since, emerging digital recorders utilize H.264 codec. 
There is a need to develop effective technique that can detect any type of inter-frame forgery in H.264 
encoded videos. 
 To overcome the shortcomings of techniques proposed so far, a unique hybrid detection model has 
been developed based on the analysis of Prediction Residual Gradient (PRG) [14] and optical Flow Gradient 
(OFG) [13] to effectively analyze the temporal consistency between successive frames of the video sequence. 
Prediction residual measures the variation in the object location whereas optical flow computes brightness 
variation among adjacent frames. Prediction residual artifacts are generally caused by reencoding of frames 
IJECE  ISSN: 2088-8708  
 
Video Inter-Frame Forgery Detection Approach for Survellance and Mobile Recorded Videos (Staffy Kingra) 
833 
from one GOP to another and have previously been utilized by the authors in [14], [15], [25], [26]. All these 
approaches detected forgeries by analyzing the abnormalities in prediction residual patterns in a different 
manner. The proposed approach introduced objectivity in the analysis of tampering artifacts by measuring the 
degree of variation from prediction residual of two adjacent frames to prediction residual of next consecutive 
pair of adjacent frames. In videos that exhibit very large motion, the prediction residual gradient computed 
between adjacent frame pairs can be very high, which can in turn causes PRG based schemes to generate 
false alarms. To overcome this limitation, the proposed technique utilizes two different features PRG and 
OFG to enable forgery detection in all kind of video sequences. The techniques proposed in [13], [27], [28] 
measured the movement in brightness pattern of individual frames and estimated Lucas-Kanade optical flow 
between adjacent frames. The discontinuity in the consistency of measured brightness pattern ensures the 
existence of tampering. Our approach utilized Horn-Schunck optical flow method which is discussed in 
Section 2.The main contributions of the proposed technique are described below.   
 
1.1. Contribution of the proposed technique 
a. An automatic detection and localization model has been developed that can detect and localize inter-
frame forgeries with an average accuracy of 89% and 81% respectively. 
b. A hybrid technique has been proposed which utilizes both the motion and brightness gradient features to 
measure variation among adjacent frames. 
c. Since subjective analysis of forensic artifacts could induce the possibility of contradiction. The proposed 
technique analyzed these artifacts in an objective manner. 
d. The performance of the proposed technique is independent of the number and location of the tampered 
frames. Moreover, we have demonstrated the efficacy of the technique on videos recorded using different 
devices, different bit-rates and compression standards. 
 
 
2. PROPOSED APPROACH 
The forgery detection scheme proposed in this paper relies on the fact that prediction residual and 
optical flow of consecutive P frames varies greatly at the location where inter-frame tampering has been 
performed. Figure 1 illustrates the functionality of the proposed model. As demonstrated in this figure, 
desired features (PRG and OFG) are computed first after extraction of I and P frames from the video 
sequence. These computed features are then compared with thresholds to generate spikes for larger 
magnitudes of PRG and OFG features. Further, check is performed on the count and continuity in these 
spikes to distinct original and forged videos. The method of computing selected features and procedure of 
detecting forgery by comparing these selected features with threshold using Algorithms 1 and 2 are discussed 
further. If continuity check provides negative results in Algorithm 1, then concerned video sequence is 
retested using Algorithm 2. If the video generates discontinuous spikes, then that indicates that the video is 
authentic. Continuous spikes, however, indicate the detection of forgery.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed Video Forgery Detection Model 
 
 
2.1. Feature Selection 
2.1.1. Prediction Residual Gradient 
The concept of prediction residual plays a very important role in the domain of video forgery 
detection. It has been extensively used in many areas like motion estimation and object tracking. Prediction 
residual is the difference between original frame and the next frame predicted from the original frame and it 
provides an idea of variation amongst adjacent frames. To predict the next frame, a standard block-matching 
algorithm is typically employed which utilizes the information of neighboring blocks from the reference 
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frame. The prediction residual is then obtained by calculating mean square error difference of each pixel in 
the block of size 16  16 with its motion shifted counterpart in the reference frame as given below. 
 
  ( )    (   )     ( ( ))       (1) 
 
                                                                                                            (2) 
 
In Equation (1),  ( ) denotes reference frame and   ( ) is considered as the block matcher 
function which predicts next frame by taking previous P or I frame as reference frame.   ( ( )) computes 
the predicted version of frame  (   ).    , prediction residual of ith frame pair, is then obtained by 
computing the difference between original (   )   frame,  (   ), and predicted version of  
(   )   frame,  ( ( )). Then, objectivity in the analysis approach is introduced by computing gradients 
of the magnitudes of prediction residual as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Computation of Gradients 
 
 
Since GOP pattern for most of the videos sequences utilized in this dataset has been computed using 
ffmpeg
1
 and was determined to be IBBPBBPBBPBBPBB. Since this technique computes gradient between 
prediction errors of consecutive P frames or consecutive I frame and P frame which are at a distance of 3 
from each other, an n-length video sequence generates nearly 
 
 
 gradients. This value will be utilized in the 
localization procedure discussed in Section 2.3. 
 
2.1.2. Optical Flow Gradient 
The measure of movement in brightness patterns among the neighboring frames is represented by 
the optical flow. It is used in many areas like video forgery detection, object detection and tracking, action 
recognition, video compression and motion estimation. Horn-Schunck algorithm [29] of optical flow is 
employed here to estimate the brightness variation from one P frame to another. This is a global method 
which introduces smoothness constraint on brightness variations at each pixel and causes smooth variation of 
brightness pattern everywhere in the frame which minimizes distortions caused due to unnecessary motion. 
By adjusting the smoothness factor, it can become adaptable to both slow and fast motion videos. Large 
positive scalar value of smoothness factor is used for videos exhibiting large motion and vice-versa. For the 
proposed technique, most suitable value of smoothness factor was empirically determined to be 10. 
Let us assume EHS(x, y, t) to be the frame brightness of a pixel (x, y) at time t. However, any 
movement in pattern never changes the brightness of particular point in the pattern and thereby brightness at 
a point always remains constant. Therefore, 
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Equation 3 represents the constraint on local flow velocity. Horn Schunck method introduced 
brightness constraint along with velocity constraint which is expressed by minimizing the square of 
magnitude of optical flow velocities as (|(|  |)|   |(|  |)|  where   and   denotes 
  
  
 and 
  
  
 respectively. 
Smoothness control factor is represented by  .  Optical flow originated by Horn Schunck is hence 
represented as 
 
                                                          
1
ffmpeg is a standard audio and video convertor, also adopted as a toolbox in MATLAB. 
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Here,   ,    and    represent the derivatives of image intensities values along  ,   and time dimensions 
respectively. The optical flow gradient, in Equation 5, is then computed by measuring the variation between 
optical flows of adjacent pairs. 
 
2.1.3. Influence of Forgery on Selected Features 
Each MPEG video exhibit fixed GOP pattern depending on the motion of objects among adjacent 
frames. Since frames in one particular GOP are highly correlated to each other, videos having large variation 
among neighboring frames exhibit large number of GOPs of shorter length. However, videos exhibiting 
smooth variation leads to less number of long length GOPs. Performing any type of inter-frame forgery 
shuffles the frames amongst neighboring GOPs which causes GOP de-synchronization and decrease in 
correlation. Due to this decreased correlation, a large variation can be observed in the prediction residual and 
optical flow of neighboring P frames. Therefore, during experimentation, high gradient value is obtained for 
large motion video sequences and low for slow ones inducing need of different thresholds for different 
videos. This need has been overcome by utilizing two features. 
To illustrate the effect of forgery on both of these features, six frames (7-12) have been deleted from 
first GOP as shown by arrows in Figure 3 causing transfer of frames from second GOP to first. Hence, the 
third and fourth P-frames of first GOP in the reconstructed video represent I-frame and first P-frame of 
second GOP respectively of the original video. In this way, large variation can be found between second and 
third P-frame as they both originate from different GOPs. Due to this, magnitude of prediction residual and 
optical flow also increases. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Effect of Tampering (GOP: shows end of first GOP) 
 
 
2.2. Proposed Methodology 
An inter-frame forgery detection model has been presented here that automatically distinguishes 
original video and a forged one without any user-computer interaction. The procedure for forgery detection 
adopted in this detection model uses two mechanisms, the first of which utilizes PRG feature given by 
Algortihm 1. In this method, prediction residual between adjacent P frames is computed first. The loop 
starting at line 7 then computes the desired feature, PRG, as explained in Section 2.1.1. Lines 11 to 13 
compare each obtained PRG with an empirically selected threshold (     ) to generate spikes at tampered 
location. Presence of continuous pair of spikes ensures the presence of forgery and their location represents 
forgery location. The continuity check is provided by the lines 15 to 19. 
 In case of discontinuous spikes, retesting of the concerned video is done using Algorithm 2, which 
utilizes OFG feature. This retesting is also done if number of spikes generated is greater than the maximum 
number of spikes possible. To compute the maximum number of relevant spikes, a window based mechanism 
is adopted here. A video sequence is partitioned into small sub-sequences of w frames. Some irrelevant 
spikes may be generated due to regular fluctuation among consecutive frames. This technique is based on the 
principle that one spike may exist in each window even for non-tampered video. Therefore, for n frames 
video sequence, presence of at most     spikes is possible even in the absence of any tampering operation. 
Utilizing this approach, window size of 80 was determined empirically. The spikes generated are 
discontinuous for non-tampered video but a continuous pair must exist in case of doctored video. Moreover, 
the videos generating more than the expected spikes have been observed to be those exhibiting large motion. 
Such videos have a high probability of generating irrelevant pair of continuous spikes. OFG value thus 
computed is then compared with another threshold (     ) selected empirically. Distinction between original 
and forged videos is performed here by analyzing spikes continuity.  
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After testing thresholds in the range of 0.1 to 20 using the proposed approach on different set of 
videos, we observed that threshold 1.8 and 2.3 provide effective results to detect forgery in low quality 
surveillance videos. Threshold value of 2.3 was found effective only for fast motion video sequences. So, 
PRG threshold of 1.8 was used for slow or moderate motion videos followed by OFG threshold of 0.2 
adjusted for large motion video sequences. Instead of analyzing object motion in fast motion videos, changes 
in the brightness pattern of adjacent frames are computed using optical flow. However, mobile videos require 
a threshold of 19 for PRG and OFG. Need of different threshold for mobile video is due to the different inter-
coding technique utilized by the encoder H.264 (main profile) and different bit rate of approximately 20 
Mbps to record the video. On the other hand, surveillance videos are encoded at a bit-rate of around 200 
Kbps with H.264 high profile codec. This high variation in the bit-rate makes the use of different thresholds 
inevitable. This threshold can be set adaptively based on the bit-rates and resolution of the video. However, 
same threshold can work efficiently for videos recorded using bit-rates in the range of around 10 Mbps. 
 
2.3. Localization of Forgery 
An automatic localization of forgery has been done by considering variable length GOP of pattern 
IBBPBBPBBPBB. As explained previously, this GOP structure has P frames located at a distance of 3 from 
each other. So, the concerned n-length video sequence exhibits     gradients. Generalizing the proposed 
approach for any GOP pattern, localization procedure is given below. 
 
  
 
Forgery Localization Steps: 
a. Locate the position on x-axis representing PRG or OFG value where two continuous peak points are 
present, (   ( )    (     )). 
b. Multiply    (     ) with  , where   is the difference in position of two continuous P frames or 
consecutive I frame and P frame. 
c. This obtained value indicates the exact frame location from where frame insertion/deletion starts or 
frame duplication ends. Sometimes, it may be possible that the obtained value indicates the forgery 
location within the range of GOP length. Therefore, exact location of tampering was found within the 
GOP length range. 
Forgery Type Classification: 
1. In case of frame deletion, continuous spikes are observed at the start of tampering. 
2. In case of frame duplication, forgery is localized at the end of series of duplicated frames. 
3. Frame insertion forgery is indicated at two locations by two pairs of continuous spikes. 
 
 
3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Video sequences generated from smart phones and surveillance cameras installed at public places are highly 
prone to inter-frame forgery. Hence, our dataset is composed of variety of video sequences categorized in 
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two groups according to the recording device used. First group contains videos recorded using surveillance 
cameras embedded in the office of an institution. On the other hand, videos contained in the second group 
have been recorded manually using mobile phones from different locations. The effect of tampering on these 
videos has been presented in this section to demonstrate the efficiency and feasibility of the proposed inter-
frame forgery detection technique. All experiments have been performed in MATLAB 2014a version in 
Windows 10 environment. 
 
3.1. Video Dataset  
There are not many publically available datasets that contain forged videos for testing video inter-
frame forgery detection techniques. Hence, the main dataset experimented in this paper is from the DIC-
Panjab University [30] which includes videos from real world surveillance cameras employed in an 
educational institute and manually recorded mobile phone videos. Each video is further segmented into video 
clips and each of these clips exhibit 800 to 900 frames. The dataset contain videos exhibiting extremely slow 
motion, slow motion, large motion and very large motion. Some of these videos represent the scenario of 
ATM vestibule and some video sequences are utilized to conceal the activity performed by respective people. 
Figure 4 illustrates some sceanrios of the test videos available in this dataset where first row shows some 
frames from the surveillance videos of Group 1. The same figure shows frames from manually recorded 
videos of group 2 in the second row. 
 
 
     
 
     
 
Figure 4. Rows showing some frames from two video sequences (first row: group 1, second row: group 2) 
 
 
3.2. Experimental layout 
a. The dataset of Group 1 has been acquired from the surveillance camera named ’Presto’ and ’Hikvision’ 
embedded at institute’s office and block entrance respectively. These videos contain both indoor and 
outdoor scenario, with and without the presence of sunlight. 
b. The dataset of Group 2 has been recorded using SONY XPERIA Z2 originally in H.264 main profile 
format. 
c. Video sequences are recorded using bit-rates in the range of 100 Kbps to 20 Mbps. H.264 and MPEG-2 
encoders are used to perform encoding and re-encoding on the concerned video sequences. 
d. Frame replication has been performed after removal of preexisting sequence of frames. Frame insertion 
forgery is done either by swapping two particular frame sequences with each other or by inserting a 
frame sequence at another location after movement of preexisting frames ahead by required steps. 
e. Minimum and maximum number of frames tampered is 10 and 60 respectively. 
 
3.3. Detection and Localization Results of Original and Forged Videos 
In this section, we present the results of experimental validation of the proposed technique. Group-1 
contains 30 non-tampered and 70 tampered videos. Among 70 tampered videos, 30 have undergone frame 
deletion forgery and remaining video sequences are equally partitioned for frame duplication and frame 
insertion forgery. For H.264 and MPEG-2 videos, this technique generated a True Positive Rate of 81% and 
77% respectively. On the other hand, Group 2 contains 100 videos out of which 20 are non-tampered. 30 
videos are utilized for frame removal forgery and 25 videos exhibit frame insertion and replication forgery 
separately. The proposed technique was found to detect video inter-frame forgery on mobile recorded H.264 
videos with an average accuracy of 86%.  
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(a) Original Video 
 
(b) Frame Deletion 
 
  
 
(c) Frame Replication 
 
(d) Frame Insertion 
 
Figure 5. Demonstrating the Effect of Forgery 
 
 
Table 1. Detection and localization of forged videos (in %) (DA: Detection Accuracy, LA: Localization 
Accuracy) 
 Group 1 Group 2 
Forgery / Result DA(%) LA(%) DA(%) LA(%) 
Original 93 - 70 - 
Frame Insertion 80 80 92 92 
Frame Removal 83 73 83 76 
Frame Replication 75 70 88 88 
 
 
Table 1 show the detection and localization accuracies for all types of inter-frame forgeries on 
Group 1 and Group 2 videos and demonstrated that this technique is effective for frame removal and 
insertion forgery. The testing of proposed algorithm on some of these videos is demonstrated in Figure 5. 
Four non-contiguous spikes are generated in the gradient pattern as shown in Figure 5(a) depicting non-
tampered video according to the algorithm. After deleting some frames (231-292) from the original video, 
testing is perfomed using the proposed approach which yields six spikes as shown in Figure 5(b). Among 
these spikes, continuous pair occurs at (76, 77) which shows that frame deletion starts from 231st frame 
(77 3=231). Thin lines represent single spikes which are non-contiguous whereas two continuous spikes in 
Figure 5 and are shown by thick blue lines.  
In the same video, replication of frame 230 on the sequence (231-291) yields continuous peak points 
at (97, 98) as in Figure 5(c). It indicates that frame duplication ends at 294th frame (98 3=294). Likewise, 
we performed frame insertion forgery on another video sequence and inserted the frame sequence (231-292) 
in place of frames (501-562). This forgery yields continuous spikes at (76, 77), (166, 167) and (187, 188) in 
Figure 5(d). These spikes depict that tampered sequence may contain 231st (77 3=231), 501st (167 3=501) 
and 564
th
 (188 3=564) frame.  
Further analysis of group 1 of the dataset is performed by varying the initial bit-rate of the video in 
the range 100 Kbps to 9 Mbps and then reencoding each video using H.264 codec by varying bit-rates in the 
same range. Table 2 presents the detection performance of the proposed technique as a function of various 
bit-rates used during recording and re-encoding. First column of this table reveals that the technique 
generated ineffective results if reconstruction of tampered video is done with low quality encoder or at low 
bit-rate. If target bit-rate is at atleast 300 Kbps larger than the initial bit-rate, the technique was found to give 
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effective results. Figure 6 is shows Detection accuracies for video sequences recorded using different bit-
rates. 
 
 
Table 2. Detection Accuracy under varying bit-rate environment of Group 1 video sequences (in %). 
(K:Kbps, M:Mbps, TBR: Target Bit Rate, IBR: Initial Bit Rate) 
TBR/ 
IBR 
100K 200K 300K 400K 500K 600K 700K 800K 900K 1M 3M 6M 9M 
100K 60 60 66 60 66 66 66 60 66 66 73 66 66 
200K 73 60 66 60 66 66 73 66 66 66 73 66 66 
300K 66 60 80 80 73 60 73 80 73 73 80 80 73 
400K 73 60 73 66 73 73 86 86 80 80 73 73 66 
500K 66 66 73 73 66 80 73 80 80 80 80 80 80 
600K 66 66 60 73 73 66 73 80 80 80 80 80 80 
700K 73 66 66 80 73 73 73 80 80 80 73 80 80 
800K 66 66 80 73 80 80 80 80 66 80 73 80 80 
900K 66 60 73 73 73 73 66 73 66 73 66 66 66 
1M 73 66 66 86 66 80 73 73 66 80 73 80 80 
3M 66 73 66 66 80 73 66 66 73 66 80 73 80 
6M 60 86 73 73 73 66 66 66 73 73 73 73 73 
9M 60 80 73 73 80 73 73 66 73 73 73 73 73 
 
 
The proposed technique was then validated on different surveillance videos from Group 1 by 
varying the initial bit-rates from 100 Kbps to 9 Mbps. If same bit-rates are used to record and encode the 
video sequence, then best results are found at 100 Kbps, 700 Kbps and 9 Mbps bit-rate. To determine the 
effectiveness of the proposed technique on any kind of video sequence, a test set is prepared by deleting and 
replicating frames in the range 10 to 60. Experimental results demonstrate that this technique can detect inter-
frame forgery irrespective of the number of frames deleted or replicated, although accuracy increases with 
increase in number of tampered frames as shown in Figure 7. Any activity in the video sequence cannot be 
concealed by tampering a mere one second which means that tampering with less than 30 frames can not 
cause any significant damage to the video. The proposed technique yields efficient results if more than 30 
frames are deleted or replicated. The decrease in detection accuracy in case of deletion of 50 frames or 
duplication of 45 frames was due to testing of proposed algorithm on extremely slow motion video sequence. 
 
 
  
Figure 6. Detection accuracies for video 
sequences recorded using different bit-rates 
Figure 7. Detection accuracies for frame deletion and 
replication in the range 10-60 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a novel technique for video inter-frame forgery detection which address all 
types of inter-frame forgeries like frame insertion, frame removal and frame replication by utilizing two 
forensic features from the literature, Prediction Residual and Optical Flow. The proposed technique works 
quite effectively for videos recorded using surveillance cameras and manually recorded mobile videos. 
Furthermore, rather than the subjective analysis of the footprints left after tampering operation, a detection 
model proposed in this paper automatically detects forged video by simply utilizing the spikes count. This 
technique was found independent of motion of objects in a video sequence, number of frames tampered, 
number of objects in a video sequence, illumination variation, recording device or compression codec 
utilized. The proposed technique can detect inter-frame forgery with an average accuracy of 83%. Even using 
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alternate bit-rates for recording and reconstructing a video does not affect the detection results of this 
technique unless the target bit-rate is extremely high or extremely low. However, our tests revealed that this 
technique suffers from performance loss when applied to videos with extremely slow motion. Tampering of 
large number of frames was found to increase the probability of forgery detection. Enhancing the efficiency 
of the proposed technique for low quality videos remains the focus of our future research. Along with 
prediction residual and optical flow, some other features can also be utilized for more effective results. 
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